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Abstract
The interregional mobility of high skilled workers might induce an
underinvestment in local public higher education when sub-federal entities
independently decide on education expenditures to maximize local output.
This well-known result is due to interregional spillovers and provides a
justiﬁcation for coordinated education policy or rather a federal intervention.
However, things might change completely when taking into account the
interregional mobility of students. Now, local education expenditures not only
aﬀect labor migration (through wage diﬀerentials) but also student migration
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1ﬂows. The model in this paper then shows that local output maximization
does not necessarily imply underprovision of higher education, since regions
now have an incentive to attract students as future human capital. The stay
rates of graduates in equilibrium and the sensitivity of wages to migration
are key determinants of local policy. Furthermore, results depend on local
government objectives or rather the weighting of natives relative to foreigners.
Therefore, the paper also considers natives’ preferred local policy.
Keywords: higher education, student mobility, labor mobility, local public
ﬁnance
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1 Introduction
Public funds make up a major part of higher education expenditures in all OECD
countries. This is especially true for several countries within the European Union
where tertiary education is to a large extent publicly provided (e.g. Germany or
France). But also in the U.S. where private universities play a much more impor-
tant role, the states are subsidizing higher education. When there are no (or rather
low) tuition fees, public education budgets mainly rely on income tax revenues. The
interregional mobility of the highly skilled individuals and therefore an important
part of the tax base, however, might put a downward pressure on local income tax
rates (Poutvaara, 2000, 2001) and therefore funds. To some extent, the tax burdenmight be shifted to a more immobile factor like unskilled labor implying increasing
inequality (Wildasin, 2000). The political support for public higher education ex-
penditures by low-ability individuals not participating in the education system and
older people basically preferring immobile public infrastructure investments to pub-
lic education provision is potentially reduced at the presence of high skilled labor
mobility (Poutvaara and Kanniainen, 2000, Konrad, 1995). Furthermore, countries
might generally underinvest in public education due to regional spillovers from mi-
gration (Justman and Thisse, 1997, 2000) or rather provide an ineﬃciently low level
of internationally applicable relative to country-speciﬁc education (Poutvaara, 2004,
2008). This underinvestment could either justify coordinated education policies or
rather interventions at a federal level or call for the availability of adequate ﬁscal
instruments like graduate taxes or tuition fees.
However, focussing on the mobility of high skilled university graduates alone only
provides an incomplete picture of human capital mobility, since it is also student
mobility becoming more and more relevant: the number of students enrolled outside
their home country increased by about 50 percent from 2000 to 2005 and more
than quadrupled over the last 30 years (OECD, 2007, p. 302). Recognizing the
empirical evidence on the relationship between student migration and subsequent
(high skilled) labor migration (e.g. Baruch, Budhwar and Khatri , 2007, Dreher and
Poutvaara, 2005, Finn, 2003), countries might have an incentive to attract students
as future human capital by means of education policy. The OECD (2007, p.303)
supports this notion: “[in] the past few years, the rise of the knowledge economy
and global competition for skills provided a new driver for the internationalisation
2of education systems in many OECD countries, whereby the recruitment of foreign
students is part of a broader strategy to recruit highly skilled immigrants.” Krieger
and Lange (2008) demonstrate that considering student and labor mobility at the
same time in a model with education policy and income tax competition between two
countries produces some interesting new insights: increasing labor mobility allows
in fact for higher income taxation and therefore revenues. This mainly comes from
a reduction in the income elasticity of the number of students in a region meaning
that the propensity to migrate as a student (who anticipates future tax policies and
potential mobility restraints) in order to escape unfavorable taxation is reduced. An
increasing student mobility, however, induces countries to engage in intensiﬁed tax
and education policy competition implying an erosion of revenues.
The paper presented here contributes to the literature on education policy with
interregionally mobile human capital in that it provides a more complete view on
decentralized resource spending by considering two types of academic mobility si-
multaneously. It reconsiders the well-known underinvestment issue in this context
and thereby extends Justman and Thisse’s (2000) two-country, one-sector analysis
by considering not only (imperfect) high skilled labor but also student mobility. I
ﬁnd that in a setting of local output maximizing governments, with a high enough
incentive to attract students by means of productivity enhancing education expen-
ditures, countries might even engage in excessive education funding. Results depend
one the stay rate of graduates in their country of education and the sensitivity of
wages to immigration. Furthermore, I consider the case of local governments only
maximizing natives’ utility. Depending on the stay rates of graduates and students,
3regions may either overinvest or underinvest in public education. The potential un-
derinvestment is basically due to high student mobility and therefore a reduced
marginal beneﬁt from a region’s public education investment. The results call for
federal interventions which must anticipate local policy adjustments very carefully.
The optimal intervention largely depends on student and labor migration propensi-
ties. Furthermore, federal initiatives to foster human capital mobility like for example
the Bologna process and the Lisbon strategy of the European Union have to be as-
sessed in respect of potentially undesirable reactions by means of education policy
at the national level.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main
ingredients of the model, develops student and labor migration probabilities and
derives the eﬀect of a country’s education policy on local human capital. Section
3 presents the globally optimal education policy which is compared to the local
policy in a decentralized equilibrium for two diﬀerent government objective functions
analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model presented in this paper is closely related to Justman and Thisse’s (2000)
model in order to make results comparable as far as possible. The main diﬀerence
– besides the consideration of student mobility of course – is in the modeling of
migration ﬂows. Here, I make use of a modiﬁed version of the approach recently
presented by Krieger and Lange (2008), where interregional income diﬀerentials and
4individual mobility costs determine migration behavior both at the student and
graduate migration stage.
2.1 Production and time structure
In each of two regions (i and j), the number of identical and perfectly competitive
ﬁrms, which produce an aggregate output good by means of human capital (denoted
by h) which is mobile between regions, an internationally immobile factor l which
might be interpreted as unskilled labor and is in ﬁxed supply, and the production
function




x x = i,j; α ∈ (0,1), (1)
where A ≥ 1 is some technology parameter, is normalized to one. The production
function satisﬁes the Inada conditions. While the speciﬁc form of the production
function is irrelevant for the results presented in this section, it is used for a numerical
exercise when it comes to the evaluation of local optimal policy. A competitive factor
market equilibrium implies that an eﬃciency unit of human capital as well as one
unit of unskilled labor supply is rewarded according to its marginal product (goods
prices are normalized to one):
f1 ≡ ∂f/∂hx = wx x = i,j (2)
f2 ≡ ∂f/∂lx = w
u
x x = i,j. (3)
The regions are assumed to be identical with respect to production technology,
endowment with the immobile factor and the size of population going for higher
5education, which is normalized to one. The human capital measure includes the
number of skilled workers within a region (natives and foreigners), where each worker
is weighted with the public expenditure on education (s) of the region where he
graduated from university. This allows to interpret s as quality of education or
rather eﬀective labor supply. Following Justman and Thisse (2000), the expenditure
is assumed to be lump-sum tax ﬁnanced in order ro really focus on education policy.
The simultaneous consideration of both tax and education policy competition is
provided for example by Krieger and Lange (2008), Haupt and Janeba (2007) and
Andersson and Konrad (2003). The determination of a region’s h requires an analysis
of students’ and workers’ migration decisions.
The time structure of the model is as follows: ﬁrst, both regions simultaneously
choose the public expenditure on higher education; then, students decide on the
location of education (they are assumed to pass the entire duration of study at the
chosen location); after graduating from university, individuals decide on whether
staying at the location of education in order to supply labor or migrating to the other
region (nature does not reveal the corresponding migration costs until the individual
graduates from university); in a ﬁnal step, the ﬁrms in both regions produce output
using human capital and the immobile factor.
2.2 Individual migration decisions
An individual’s lifetime utility is described by the following utility function:
U = sxwx − δm0 − θm x = i,j (4)
6where the ﬁrst term represents labor income (which is the product of eﬀective labor
supply sx and the wage rate per unit of eﬀective labor wx). See that this formulation
captures four diﬀerent types of careers (let us take the perspective of an individual
born in i): study in i and work in i (labor income=siwi), study in i and work in j
(siwj), study in j and work in j (sjwj) and study in j and work in the country of
origin i (sjwi). An implicit assumption here is that education is fully internationally
applicable. The parameters δ and θ take the value of one if an individual migrates
at the student migration stage (δ = 1), at cost m0, and/or the labor migration
stage (θ = 1), at cost m, and zero otherwise. Migration costs m0 ∈ [m0,m0] and
m ∈ [m,m] are uniformly distributed among individuals. The corresponding density
functions are f(m0) = 1/∆m0 and f(m) = 1/∆m with ∆m0 = (m0 − m0) and
∆m = (m−m). I do not restrict migration costs to be non-negative: in fact, I assume
m0,m ≤ 0. Negative migration costs imply a strong individual migration propensity.
While positive costs m0 represent some kind of home attachment, positive costs m
imply an attachment to the location of education (both of domestic and foreign
students) reﬂecting social ties or rather networks in general, built up in the education
period. In what follows, I assume m > |m|, implying that the expected value of m or
rather the average mobility cost is positive (E{m} =
R m
m mf(m)dm = 1
2(m+m) > 0).
This is analogously assumed for m0. The fact that there is no discounting between
periods in this model does not change the results qualitatively.
From the utility function and by means of backward induction, we can determine
the individuals’ migration decisions. After graduating from a university in i (j), an
7individual stays in i (j) if his
m > si(wj − wi) (m > sj(wi − wj)), (5)
i.e. if migration costs exceed the labor income diﬀerential between regions, given
that the individual obtained a university degree in region i (j). At the student
migration stage, an individual not only takes into account migration costs m0 but
also expectations about the migration costs m which are not revealed until the
individual ﬁnishes his studies and which occur if the individual wants to leave the
location of education. An individual born in region i compares his expected lifetime
utility E{Ui
i} from staying in the home region in order to study there with the
expected utility E{Ui
j} from studying in the other region. See that
E{U
i
i} = Pr{m > si(wj − wi)}siwi
+ Pr{m < si(wj − wi)}[siwj − E{m|m < si(wj − wi)}]. (6)
With probability Pr{m > si(wj − wi)} the individual stays in region i after grad-
uating from university and earns labor income siwi. With probability Pr{m <
si(wj − wi)}, however, the individual decides to work in j and to earn siwj. The
expected migration costs are E{m|m < si(wj − wi)}. Alternatively, the individual
born in i can also decide to study in j. The corresponding expected utility then is
E{U
i
j} = Pr{m > sj(wi − wj)}sjwj
+ Pr{m < sj(wi − wj)}[sjwi − E{m|m < sj(wi − wj)}] − m0. (7)
The main diﬀerence compared to the case of studying in i is that now, the individual
has to bear the cost m0 at the ﬁrst stage. Then, an individual from region i decides
8to stay in i at the ﬁrst stage if E{Ui
i} > E{Ui
j}. Using (6) and (7) yields after some
manipulations the following migration decision: an individual from region i stays in
i in order to attend university if his








From this condition and the assumption of uniformly distributed migration costs,
we can derive the number of students within region i. It consists of the number of
those individuals who are born in i and stay there at stage one (denoted by Γi)
and of individuals born in j who decided not to study in their home region but in i
(1 − Γj). The number of students in i then is
Ψi = Γi + (1 − Γj)








As can be inferred from the expression above, the number of students in a country
depends on education policy. Calculating dΨi/dsi, evaluating this derivative at a
symmetric equilibrium (implying si = sj = s, Ψi = Ψj = 1, hi = hj = h = s and





















First of all, increasing education expenditures attracts additional students who ben-
eﬁt from higher expenditures in terms of higher income in the future. This eﬀect is
represented by the ﬁrst summand in (10). The second term captures the eﬀect of a
9change in the wage diﬀerential between countries which is inﬂuenced by labor mi-
gration ﬂows subsequent to student ﬂows. The more student immigration translates
into subsequent residence (i.e. the larger (m+m)/∆m), the more relevant becomes
this wage eﬀect.
2.3 Human capital
Using migration decisions and the distributions of migration costs among individuals,
ﬁnally, human capital in region i can be written as
hi =
[m − si(wj − wi)]
∆m
Ψisi +
[sj(wi − wj) − m]
∆m
Ψjsj, (11)
where the ﬁrst summand represents the number of students in i staying in i after
graduating from university (weighted with the public education expenditure in i)
and the second summand represents the number of individuals educated in region j
and working in i (weighted with the education expenditure in region j).
Obviously, hi (as well as hj of course) depends on the education policy in both
regions. When it comes to the analysis of i’s optimal (local) education policy, the
eﬀect of a marginal expenditure increase on the size of the human capital measure
within both regions plays a decisive role. It is therefore necessary to determine



































10The human capital measure is not only directly aﬀected by an increase in the edu-
cation expenditure but also indirectly via its eﬀect on the number of students and
therefore – with a certain probability of students staying in the country of their
education – on the number of workers in the country and via the change in the































The eﬀect of an increase in the education expenditure on the wage rate diﬀerential
depends on the eﬀect of the expenditure increase on human capital. Evaluated at a




















Using this expression and the eﬀect of a marginal expenditure increase on the number






















Recognizing that m/∆m represents the stay rate of graduates in the country of
education in equilibrium (denoted by p > 1/2 in what follows) and with (−m)/∆m =


















Stay rates smaller than one capture the fact that there are further (non-monetary)
migration determinants beside income diﬀerentials. In order to illustrate the new
11insights from considering student mobility and as a benchmark, it seems useful to
present (dhi/dsi)equ. from a simpler version of the model with immobile students











This basically reproduces the expression presented by Justman and Thisse (2000,
p. 252). The main diﬀerence comes from their explicit consideration of a worker’s
responsiveness to interregional income diﬀerentials. Implicitly, the individual respon-
siveness in the model presented here is one and therefore has the same weight as
migration costs capturing non-wage migration determinants. The overall relevance
of the ‘wage eﬀect’ due to migration is therefore solely determined by the character-
istics of the production function or rather f11.
The consideration of student mobility is ﬁrst of all reﬂected in the marginal
beneﬁt from attracting students by increased education expenditures (as represented
by (2(2p−1)/∆m0)sf1 in (16)). The higher the stay rate of graduates, the more does
an increase in the number of students translate into an increase of human capital
and therefore the larger (dhi/dsi)equ.. Secondly, the additional wage eﬀect which can
be traced back to student migration has to be considered (ﬁrst term in brackets in
the last summand of the numerator and the denominator respectively). Again, the
higher the stay rate, the more relevant becomes this eﬀect.
123 Global output maximizing policy
The centralized solution with respect to education policy serves as a benchmark when
it comes to an evaluation of the decentralized outcome. A federal institution would
maximize global output or rather the wage sum of residents (the equivalence is due
to ﬁrms’ zero net proﬁtability conditions in a competitive market equilibrium) net
of public expenditures on higher education in both regions by choosing an education
policy which equates the human capital’s marginal product and the marginal cost
of spending resources on higher education in each region. I assume resource costs
following the cost function ci(si) = csi here. As in the model of Justman and Thisse
(2000, p. 252), the ﬁrst order condition for the global output maximizing expenditure
then is
f1(hx,lx) = c x = i,j (18)
or rather
f1(s,l) = c (19)
in a symmetric solution (i.e. hi = hj = si = sj = s).
4 Decentralized education policy
Strategic interaction in decentralized policy making in the context of public edu-
cation funding or rather expenditure competition can generally occur for example
on the state or country level. In any case, the relative weight of ‘foreigners’ in lo-
cal authorities’ decision making might vary. Therefore, following especially Justman
13and Thisse (2000), I will deal with two cases: in section 4.1 local governments are
assumed to care only about residents (skilled and unskilled workers independently of
their origin), while in section 4.2 they only consider natives’ interests (independently
of their residence).
4.1 Maximizing residents’ wage sum
Decentralized education policy making in a setting of local governments maximizing
the wage sum of local workers (natives and foreigners), implies competition for hu-
man capital. Let the regions maximize local output (which is equal to the local wage
sum) net of education expenditures, i.e. region i faces the following optimization




LO = f(hi,li) − csi. (20)








Comparing the centralized and the decentralized solution, with (dhi/dsi)◦
equ. < 1 and
f11 < 0, the well-known underinvestment result (as presented in Justman and Thisse,
2000, p. 253) emerges unambigously: as a country’s marginal increase of education
expenditure does not translate one-to-one into an increase of human capital, there is
a reduced incentive to provide public education locally compared to the centralized
solution. This, however, needs no longer to be the case if there is an additional
beneﬁt from increasing expenditure via the attraction of students as future human
capital.
14With labor and student mobility, results are ambiguous and an analytical so-
lution cannot be derived. Therefore, the main insights are presented by means of
intuition and an illustrative numerical exercise here. I am mostly interested in two
parameters basically driving the results: the stay rate of graduates in equilibrium p
and α from the production function, which determines the sensitivity of wages on
changes in the size of the labor force or rather migration ﬂows. The other parameters
in the example are chosen as follows: A = 1.4, l = 1, c = 1, ∆m = ∆m0 = 1. Using
the functional form of the production function as presented in (1) in the local ﬁrst
order condition, allows to ﬁnd optimal values for the local education expenditure
depending on p and α by using a numerical solver.1
As can be seen from Figure 1, expenditures increase both in the graduates’ stay
rate and α. The higher stay rates, the higher the ‘return’ to education expenditures
from the local perspective and therefore the higher the incentive to invest. For the
parameter range of α in the diagram, the sensitivity of wages to a human capital
increase decreases, i.e. d|f11|/dα < 0. The smaller the wage eﬀect, i.e. the smaller
|f11|, the larger (dhi/dsi)equ. and therefore s. See that p > 0.5 is already suﬃcient









Using (16) and rewriting the equation yields




+ (1 − α)η

sα = 0,
where η ≡ (2p − 1)2/∆m0 + 1/∆m.
15for ∂[(dhi/dsi)equ.]/∂|f11| < 0.
Figure 1: Sensitivity of the local expenditure to p and α
With the additional beneﬁt from a marginal increase of the local education ex-
penditure in a world with student mobility compared to a setting as presented for
example by Justman and Thisse (2000), the question arises whether for local entities
there is still an incentive to underinvest in education compared to the centralized
solution. If (dhi/dsi)equ. was equal to one, local entities would choose the globally
optimal level of education resources. Figure 2 ﬁrst of all illustrates that there really
exist combinations of stay rates and α’s for which local and central expenditure













where s = (Aα/c)1/(1−α) is the optimal education policy. Furthermore, with the lo-
cal s increasing in p and α as illustrated in Figure 1, we can also determine areas
16of under- and overinvestment: the higher stay rates and the lower the eﬀect of mi-
gration on wages, i.e. the higher α, the larger the tendency to overinvest in local
education. While combinations located in the north-east of the ‘global-optimality-
line’ imply a local overinvestment incentive, combinations in the south-west mean
underinvestment.
Figure 2: Areas of over-, under- and globally optimal investment at the local level
At this stage it seems indicated to brieﬂy reconsider the assumption on the
resource cost function ci(si). I simply assumed a constant marginal cost of using
resources here. This seems justiﬁable at least at the country or state level where
politicians decide on educational budgets. One might argue, however, that there
are costs ci = c(Ψi)si depending (positively) on the number of students enrolled.
In that case – provided that overall dΨi/dsi > 0 – from the point of view of a
local entity there is an additional cost of attracting students by means of increasing
resources, namely c0(dΨi/dsi)si. If there was nothing to gain from the attraction of
17foreign students, countries would clearly underinvest in education compared to the
centralized solution. Del Rey (2001) makes this point in a model where students
always pay taxes in their home countries and there are no discriminatory tuition
fees. In the context presented here, the stronger the marginal cost eﬀect is relative
to the additional beneﬁt from attracting students as future human capital, the more
likely the underinvestment result will emerge. Nevertheless, variable costs probably
play a more important role at the university than the state or country level in which
I am interested here.
4.2 Maximizing natives’ wage sum
Justman and Thisse’s (2000) explanation for a potential source of underinvestment
in public education, namely high skilled labor mobility, is not the only lesson to
learn from their analysis. The demonstration that assumptions on local government
objectives drive the results is just as important. In their model, “[decentralization]
leads to under-investment in education when political interests are predominantly
deﬁned in geographic terms and local governments act to maximize regional output,
but may over-invest when political interests of native-born highly educated are well
presented”(Justman and Thisse, 2000, p. 255). Reassessing this issue in the context
of the extended model presented here as well seems worthwhile.
Think of an objective function which considers only the native-born skilled pop-
ulation – which studies and works either in the home country or abroad – and the







i sif1(hi,li) + P
ij
i sif1(hj,lj) + P
ji
i sjf1(hi,li) + P
jj
i sjf1(hj,lj)
+ lif2(hi,li) − csi. (23)
The P’s represent the number of workers who are born in i (subscript) and who
















[(wi − wj)sj − m]
∆m
(1 − Γi) , P
jj
j ≡
[m − sj(wi − wj)]
∆m
(1 − Γi).

















































− c = 0. (24)
Calculating the derivatives (please refer to the Appendix), evaluating the whole
condition at a symmetric equilibrium, using (dhi/dsi)equ. and (dhj/dsi)equ. from sec-
tion 2 and the properties of the production function (especially f21 = f12 and
hf11(h,l) + lf12(h,l) = 0 ⇔ lf12(s,l)
(equ.) = −sf11(s,l)), we ﬁnally end up with







19where p0 ≡ Γequ. = m0/∆m0 and (1−p0) ≡ (1−Γequ.) = −m0/∆m0 refer to students’
migration propensities in equilibrium. Again, a numerical example helps to illustrate
the results. The speciﬁcation is as follows: A = 1.4, α = 0.7, ∆m0 = ∆m = 1, c=1.
As can be seen in Figure 3 where the light-colored plain indicates the globally optimal
expenditure level, again, both scenarios – over- and underinvestment – may result
from decentralized education policy.
Figure 3: Centralized vs. local policy in native product maximization
See that now, students’ migration behavior plays a decisive role. For p0 = 1, i.e.
no student migration in equilibrium, the local ﬁrst order condition coincides with
the one presented by Justman and Thisse (2000, p. 256) and we come up to the










Please note that p0 = 1 does not mean there is no student migration at all. It
20only says that there are no other than income motives for student migration. In
order to understand why there might also exist an underinvestment incentive, it is
helpful to abstain from the wage eﬀect for a moment to spot the crucial mechanism
at work. If the wage diﬀerential between countries was not aﬀected by a change in
education policy, the local ﬁrst order condition would reduce to
f1p0 = c. (27)
Since only those natives beneﬁt from the increased expenditure in their home region
who stay there as students, a stay rate p0 smaller than one implies that regions (max-
imizing only natives’ incomes) only gain part of the investment’s marginal beneﬁt
while bearing the entire marginal cost. Compared to the centralized solution where
both domestic and foreign residents are considered, this generates the underinvest-
ment result following from (27) due to f1 > c and the assumptions on production
technology. This is in line with the argument presented by B¨ uttner and Schwager
(2004) in a model with interregionally mobile students in a federation, calling for
tuition fees at the federal level.
Further inspection of (25) indicates that an increase of the wage eﬀect (i.e.
d|f11| > 0) – ceteris paribus – increases the local provision of resources, if
(dhi/dsi)equ. > 1/2.
215 Conclusion
The analysis presented here is inspired by the increasing relevance of student mobil-
ity and the potential interest of countries to attract foreign students as future human
capital. Increasing eﬀorts of OECD countries to facilitate foreign students’ passover
from university to the domestic labor market after graduation (see e.g. Tremblay,
2005) support the view that countries are aware of this option. When public re-
sources spent on higher education attract foreign students due to their productivity
enhancing eﬀect, the well-known underinvestment result from models exclusively
focussing on labor mobility does not necessarily carry over to settings where there
is something to gain from attracting students. I ﬁnd that local output maximizing
countries tend to overinvest in higher education if equilibrium stay rates of gradu-
ates are suﬃciently high and the wage eﬀect from immigration is only modest. In a
model of two private schools or rather universities maximizing proﬁts by means of
both resources and tuition fees with a pool of mobile students, Boadway, Marceau
and Marchand (1996) ﬁnd that – under certain conditions – institutions overinvest in
terms of resources spent on institutions’ quality in a symmetric decentralized Nash
equilibrium compared to a planner’s solution. In fact, there is some analogy between
our models: while it is universities beneﬁtting from attracting students in terms of
increasing revenue from tuition fees in their framework, I presented countries bene-
ﬁtting from student immigration via subsequent human capital ‘immigration’. The
latter concept is also presented by Kemnitz (2005) who shows that a suﬃciently low
ﬁscal ‘leakage’ of the local education investment in a federation which is not only
22due to graduate mobility but also ﬁscal equalization could induce an excessive local
spending.
In the light of Justman and Thisse’s (2000) insight that local objective func-
tions or rather the relative weight of foreigners in the objective function crucially
determine education policy, I consider not only residents’ but also natives’ utility
maximization at the local level. When policy is only driven by natives’ interests,
students’ migration propensity comes into play: basically, the lower student stay
rates in equilibrium, the lower a country’s marginal beneﬁt from resource spending
and therefore the larger the tendency to underinvest in education. A priori, results
are ambiguous again.
The results – and especially the ambiguity of results – advise against overhasty
calls for speciﬁc forms of federal intervention in education policy. Depending on
government objectives and human capital migration propensities, the use of fed-
eral subsidies for local educational systems or tuition fees could cause undesirable
outcomes. Federal interventions of course need not be limited to the use of ﬁscal
instruments. The European Union could serve as an example here: while the design
of public education policy is left to the member states, there are initiatives at the
Union level like the Bologna process and the Lisbon strategy intended to enhance
(academic) mobility. Although these programs are probably not primarily aimed at
the correction of national policies, against the background of the analysis presented
here, these eﬀorts could lead to a convergence of decentralized education policy to
a common optimum – but they need not. In general, a targeted federal interven-
23tion premises ﬁrst of all knowledge of the kind of discrepancy between local and
globally optimal policy (i.e. over- vs. underinvestment) and second the reaction of
strategically interacting local entities to parameter changes within their sphere of
authority.
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which however cancels out in the ﬁrst order condition anyway.
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